FDIC: Whole Loan vs. Structured Sales

Whole-loan sales are all-cash deals, with no profit-sharing involved. The move to structured offerings, which would involve portfolios of roughly $1 billion apiece, has received largely negative reviews from countless investors and advisers…

The View from Barclay’s

Where we are, where we’ve been, and where we’re going. Brought to you by the lovely Michelle Meyer, Barclay Capital’s “senior” U.S. economist.

Securitization & Lender Liability Report

By Oliver Wright Esq. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are a type of asset-backed security and structured credit product. CDOs gain exposure to the creditof a portfolio of fixed-income assets and divide the credit risk among different tranches: senior (rated AAA), mezzanine (AA to BB), and equity (unrated). Losses are applied in reverse of seniority, thus [...]

Negative Equity Report

$3 Trillion of Property–1/3 of all mortgages–Underwater, at Risk of Default. More than 15 million U.S. mortgages (%32 of all mortgaged properties) were net negative as of June 30, 2009. June’s negative equity share was slightly lower than the 32.5 percent as of the end of March 2009, reflecting the recent flattening of monthly home [...]

Today's Quote:

\\If you look at any measure of consumer or investor confidence today, if you look at any measure of the strength and stability of the American economy, if you look at any measure of confidence in the financial system, it is substantially stronger today than when the President took office.\\

The (slightly delusional) Treasury Secretary

Recent Articles:

Bulk Sales Net Higher Return to Banks and Investors Than Retail

Bulk Sales Net Higher Return to Banks and Investors Than Retail

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ.
Numbers from ratings agency Standard & Poors spell out the cost of foreclosure to mortgage investors and banks. For subprime loans underwritten in 2006 it’s about 20% of the loan amounts outstanding. Here’s how they get that number:

S&P figures 42% of the loans made that year to borrowers with bad credit will go into foreclosure.
Then it calculates 45% of the amount owed on those loans will be lost. Here’s the breakdown on that: 19% is lost due to the decline in the market value of the home. That’s about a $40,000 loss on a typical loan of $210,000. Then there is the 26% lost to the costs of foreclosure. It can take a year or more to go through the whole process from when a borrower stops paying to when the house is finally sold and the lender recoups whatever money it can. There’s 13.6% of the loan amount lost in interest payments. About 3% of the home value the lender has to pay in property taxes. There’s 1% in legal fees, 6% to real estate agents, about 3% of the loan spent on home maintenance.

Big Banks Ease Loan Loss Reserves and Boost Profits as Chargeoffs Abate

April 28, 2010 Featured No Comments

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ.

A handful of the biggest banks jolted market watchers last quarter by clawing back some loss reserves. Reserving has been wrought with confusion and controversy since the start of the recession, as investors and regulators worried that the country’s top banks would go under without adequate capital to cover losses as the mortgage market collapsed. The issue of reserves remains divisive now that it looks as if they are plateauing and poised to shrink industry-wide. Wall Street welcomed news that banks with big reserves were comfortable enough with their loss projections to start releasing some. Skeptics, meanwhile, questioned the wisdom of doing so this early in the recovery.

Richard K. Davis, the chairman and chief executive of U.S. Bancorp in Minneapolis, for one, said last week in discussing why his company keeps building reserves that the number of banks releasing reserves caught him off guard. Banking analysts said they had not anticipated reserves falling until later this year, though they said this first round of releases was not rash, given signs that loan losses are stabilizing.

“I would also add that the overall credit trends showed greater improvement, stronger improvement than I was looking for… allowing these banks to release the reserves.”

Banks build reserves by setting aside more loss provisions than chargeoffs. They shrink them by doing the opposite. “The reserves are there to anticipate chargeoffs-the chargeoffs are happening,” McEvoy said. “Why do you need to refill the reserve? You don’t.” The seven large banking companies that have released reserves-which include Huntington Bancshares Inc., Capital One Financial Corp., First Horizon Corp. and Citigroup Inc.-are well above the industry average when it comes to key ratios like allowances-to-total-loans and allowances-to-nonperforming-loans.

Bank of America, for instance, has an allowance-to-loan ratio of 6.8%, among the highest in banking. The average ratio for banks with at least $10 billion of assets was 3.66% at year-end, according to federal data. The other six lenders’ ratios are all higher than that. U.S. Bancorp, meanwhile, has allowances covering 3.6% of loans, so it does not have as much freedom as the others to release reserves. Its reserves rose 3.3% from the prior quarter, to $5.44 billion.

We’re still in the midst of a downturn, and the evidence of an economic recovery is still pretty mixed…You’re seeing reserve release at those [banks] with the most cushion against their portfolios and, more specifically, those with reserves allocated against commercial portfolios.

He said commercial credit is “holding up better than expected.” Reserves, for the most part, are a bank’s best guess-based on math and professional judgment-of how much money it will need to cover eventual losses on bad loans. Banks rely on hard data like past chargeoff and delinquency rates as well as on subjective outlooks about the economy’s direction. Loss forecasts eased dramatically during the first three months of the year, as banks across the board said fewer consumer and commercial borrowers had missed at least one loan payment. Rates of new delinquent borrowers are also falling to pre-recession levels. These are key gauges of prospective losses.

Shadow Inventory Will Take Three Years To Clear

Shadow Inventory Will Take Three Years To Clear

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ.
The ‘shadow inventory’ of homes includes all delinquent loans and real-estate owned (REO) property that has not reached the market. REO property are foreclosed homes taken back by the bank for liquidation. As for the total amount of homes in the shadow inventory, Amherst Securities places the total at 7m. The Royal Bank of Scotland found 2.7m, and First American CoreLogic counted 1.7m. S&P estimates the inventory to equal a 33-month supply of homes. Analysts added the estimate is actually conservative, as they did not assume homes not showing signs of distress would default and push the overhang of supply even further.

“Overall, it is our opinion that recent positive housing reports should not be construed as a sign that the distress in the residential housing market is abating, but rather should be attributed to the temporarily limited supply of homes on the market,” according to the report.
Furthermore, court delays, political pressure and servicing backlogs constricted the flow of foreclosures hitting the market to a trickle. These delinquent borrowers who have not received a foreclosure fuel the “rapidly” growing shadow inventory of properties, according to the report.

Distressed Real Estate Sales Running Hot

April 12, 2010 Featured No Comments
Distressed Real Estate Sales Running Hot

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ. – According to First American Core Logic, distressed home sale prices have been running at around a one-third discount from market sales prices for the last year. In January the average price for a house sold on the open market was $247,700, but the average REO property sold for $141,900 and the average short sale brought $215,300. The average price for all distressed properties was $161,600.

Riverside, California had the largest percentage of distressed sales among the 25 largest markets at 62 percent of all sales followed by Las Vegas and Sacramento at 59 percent and 58 percent respectively.

The largest share of bank-owned housing sales occurred in Detroit (48 percent) and Riverside (47 percent). The highest percentage of short sales was recorded in San Diego (19 percent) followed by Sacramento (18 percent) and Oakland (16 percent). While Florida is home to all 10 markets having the most foreclosures, only Orlando and Cape Coral were among the top cities for distressed sales; a byproduct, no doubt, of the judicial foreclosure process required in that state, which extends the foreclosure time-line compared to other distressed states like California and Nevada.

Homebuyer Beware: Title Insurance Companies Nix Creditors’ Rights Coverage

March 7, 2010 Featured No Comments
Homebuyer Beware: Title Insurance Companies Nix Creditors’ Rights Coverage

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT

Recently, various national title insurance companies, such as First American Title Insurance Company and the entire Fidelity National Title Group–which includes Chicago Title Insurance Company, Fidelity National Title, Ticor Title, Lawyers Title, Commonwealth Land Title, Security Union Title and Alamo Title–officially announced that, effective immediately, creditors’ rights coverage will no longer be available by endorsement, affirmative coverage, issuance of the American Land Title Association (ALTA) 1970 policies or otherwise. This change affects both owner’s and loan policies.

Creditors' rights coverage previously provided the purchaser of real property or its lender with insurance that the transaction at issue would not be unwound or set aside by a creditor of the seller or borrower, as applicable, on the basis of the transaction constituting a voidable preference or fraudulent conveyance under federal bankruptcy, state insolvency or similar creditors' rights laws.

Creditors’ rights coverage previously provided the purchaser of real property or its lender with insurance that the transaction at issue would not be unwound or set aside by a creditor of the seller or borrower, as applicable, on the basis of the transaction constituting a voidable preference or fraudulent conveyance under federal bankruptcy, state insolvency or similar creditors’ rights laws. This coverage also included attorneys’ fees and defense costs resulting from such claims. The costs in these cases can be substantial.

The elimination of title insurance, and the resulting significant costs from a claim by a creditor, underscores that buyers and lenders may want to conduct a greater level of due diligence regarding the parties to the transaction and the terms of each transaction to identify whether any of the elements of a potential claim by a creditor exists. In general, a successful creditors’ claim requires proof that the transaction was either: (i) made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor or (ii) for less than “reasonably equivalent value” when the transferor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of it. If a successful preference or fraudulent transfer claim is asserted by a creditor, a court may set aside the subject transaction. The analysis would be fact-specific and may turn on the circumstances of a particular transaction. However, for any transaction, a buyer or lender may want to examine all available data and information to identify if any of the foregoing factors are present. … Continue Reading

FDIC Watchdog Urges Improvement In Agency’s Loan-Modification Program Through Loss Share Enforcement

March 7, 2010 Featured No Comments
FDIC Watchdog Urges Improvement In Agency’s Loan-Modification Program Through Loss Share Enforcement

Posted by Oliver Wright

Starting with loan-modification standards implemented at the failed IndyMac Bank, the FDIC has required failed-bank acquirers to comply with the program in order to receive claims under loss-sharing deals with the agency.

failed-bank acquirers subject to the eight-largest shared-loss deals as of August had completed just over 4,300 modifications,
Generally, modifications must produce a greater value than a foreclosure would, and a monthly payment not exceeding 31% of a homeowner’s gross monthly income. The February report by the FDIC’s inspector general said failed-bank acquirers subject to the eight-largest shared-loss deals as of August had completed just over 4,300 modifications, and had almost 6,500 in process. The report was released Wednesday. The report suggested that the FDIC strengthen the program to make it more consistent with the Obama administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program, which made $75 billion available to promote loan workouts. Specifically, the IG said the FDIC could improve the agreements with failed-bank acquirers for complying with the agency’s program, the program’s underwriting and reporting requirements and how assuming institutions monitor and detect fraud in loan modifications.

<style type="text/css" media="all">@import "http://hbr.hbrstatic.com/StyleSheets/docLink.css";</style><p><b>From: </b> <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-220170340.html?refid=blog_10293106" target="_blank">IG Proposes Changes to FDIC's Mods.(Market Monitor)(Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.)(Brief article)</a> by Adler, Joe<br/><b>Source: </b>American Banker, 3/4/2010.<br/><b>Via: </b><a href="http://www.highbeam.com"><img src="http://hbr.hbrstatic.com/img/h-icon-small.gif" alt="HighBeam Research Logo" border="0" align="baseline"/></a> HighBeam&trade; Research<br/>COPYRIGHT 2009 SourceMedia, Inc.</p>

Doing the Market’s Dirty Work: How FDIC Closes Troubled Banks

February 7, 2010 Featured Comments Off
Doing the Market’s Dirty Work: How FDIC Closes Troubled Banks
posted by Oliver Wright Esq.

When financially frail firms can’t pay creditors, they fail. The market drives the process like this: First, the firm starts losing. Second, creditors discover the losses and increase their estimate of the firm’s probability of default. Third, to reward themselves for this increased risk, creditors demand higher interest rates or require debt repayment.Fourth, when the firm can’t raise additional funds to meet those demands, it defaults.

During the 1980s many insured depository institutions remained open long after they became insolvent. As a result, financial resources were tied up in inefficient operations for extended periods.
Fifth, creditors force the firm into bankruptcy or the firm privately arranges with creditors for a payout of firm assets. In either case, the assets can be redeployed to more valuable uses, thus benefiting society in that business resources are not devoted to ineffectual enterprises. But what about banks? Deposit insurance short-circuits the market’s discipline of banks, thus muting the societal benefits that naturally accrue via the above process. Because market forces are unlikely to bring about the timely closure of troubled banks, the government agencies that charter and supervise banks are typically left to decide when a bank is no longer viable and should be closed. Mistakes by the agencies can create significant inefficiencies.

For example, during the 1980s many insured depository institutions remained open long after they became insolvent. As a result, financial resources were tied up in inefficient operations for extended periods. Legislators recognized the problem and in 1991 enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). The Act required bank supervisors to step in and close depository institutions more quickly and reformed the process by which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation disposed of failed depositories. All of which raise the crucial question: How do these agencies decide when to step in under rules established by the FDICIA? Further, how do the agencies proceed following intervention?

The following article answers these questions….

Big Banks Look to Corporate Banking Over Trading Income

January 7, 2010 Featured No Comments
Big Banks Look to Corporate Banking Over Trading Income

Posted by Oliver Wright Esq.

Can corporate and investment banking anchor big banks’ bottom lines — again?

With loan defaults surging, Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. relied heavily on revenue from fixed-income and equity trading to offset credit-related losses in 2009.

But there is growing concern that such sources of income will be weaker this year, putting more pressure on corporate finance to fill the void.

Such a gamble on a sustained economic recovery, combined with the lingering threat of heightened governmental oversight, could portend a bumpy year ahead, some industry watchers said.
Such a gamble on a sustained economic recovery, combined with the lingering threat of heightened governmental oversight, could portend a bumpy year ahead, some industry watchers said.

Analysts said they hope CEOs address the questions when the big banks report fourth-quarter results. JPMorgan Chase is set to be the first of the three biggest banks to report, on Jan. 15.

Steve Stelmach, an analyst with Friedman, Billings Ramsey & Co. Inc., forecasts an overall 15% decline in trading revenue in 2010, partly because of tighter spreads and less volatility. It remains unclear whether investment banking operations can play catch up elsewhere.

“We believe that most of the easy money has already been made,” Stelmach said. “Investors are going to be disappointed if they are looking for 2010 earnings growth to be a repeat of 2009.”

… Continue Reading

New Real Estate Firm Serves Speculative Buyers at Trustee Sales Auctions

January 3, 2010 Featured No Comments
New Real Estate Firm Serves Speculative Buyers at Trustee Sales Auctions

Posted By Oliver Wright, Esq.

The challenge for buyers is that most are unable to track all the homes scheduled for auction...
TREO Capital Group, Inc., a real estate firm that aims to help buyers capitalize on opportunities in the residential foreclosure market, monitors  and purchases distressed-priced residential real estate at auctions in Los Angeles County. TREO principals have already purchased over 30 homes for prospective buyers. “Currently there are thousands of distressed-priced homes scheduled for auction each week in LA County alone,” said Mr. Paul, president, who is also the former head of the foreclosure divisions of Merrill Lynch Realty and Prudential California Realty. “The challenge for buyers is that most are unable to track all the homes scheduled for auction, analyze all the market and sales data, perform a title search and make a decision to buy … oftentimes in a matter of hours.” The company said most of its clients acquire multiple properties each month seeking to earn yields that can regularly exceed 30% IRR. Messrs. Paul and Robotti’s SCI Real Estate Investments has a nationwide portfolio with over $2 billion worth of residential and commercial properties.

Stalking Horse Bids on TBW Bulk REO Portfolio

December 7, 2009 Featured No Comments
Stalking Horse Bids on TBW Bulk REO Portfolio

By Oliver Wright Esq.

The bankruptcy court overseeing the liquidation of mortgage lender Taylor Bean & Whitaker has approved a stalking-horse bid on the nonbank’s real estate-owned portfolio which includes almost 2,000 properties.  The portfolio has been appraised at $330 million. A stalking-horse bid is a strategy whereby a bankrupt company obtains an initial bid on its assets from an interested buyer of their choosing. TBW’s chief restructuring officer plans to accept competing bids on Dec. 9. Ocala, Fla.-based TBW filed for bankruptcy protection in August after the Department of Housing and Urban Development pulled its FHA credentials.

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Bulk Sales Net Higher Return to Banks and Investors Than Retail

May 1, 2010

Bulk Sales Net Higher Return to Banks and Investors Than Retail

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ. Numbers from ratings agency Standard & Poors spell out the cost of foreclosure to mortgage investors and banks. For subprime loans underwritten in 2006 it’s about 20% of the loan amounts outstanding. Here’s how they get that number: Then it calculates 45% of the amount owed on those loans will [...]

Big Banks Ease Loan Loss Reserves and Boost Profits as Chargeoffs Abate

April 28, 2010

Big Banks Ease Loan Loss Reserves and Boost Profits as Chargeoffs Abate

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ. A handful of the biggest banks jolted market watchers last quarter by clawing back some loss reserves. Reserving has been wrought with confusion and controversy since the start of the recession, as investors and regulators worried that the country’s top banks would go under without adequate capital to cover losses [...]

Shadow Inventory Will Take Three Years To Clear

April 27, 2010

Shadow Inventory Will Take Three Years To Clear

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ. The ‘shadow inventory’ of homes includes all delinquent loans and real-estate owned (REO) property that has not reached the market. REO property are foreclosed homes taken back by the bank for liquidation. As for the total amount of homes in the shadow inventory, Amherst Securities places the total at 7m. [...]

Distressed Real Estate Sales Running Hot

April 12, 2010

Distressed Real Estate Sales Running Hot

POSTED BY OLIVER WRIGHT ESQ. – According to First American Core Logic, distressed home sale prices have been running at around a one-third discount from market sales prices for the last year. In January the average price for a house sold on the open market was $247,700, but the average REO property sold for $141,900 [...]